Certainty’s Bulwark at Rationality’s Edge? Reframing the Disagreement between Humean Skeptics and Constitutivist Hinge Epistemologists
Abstract
This paper critically examines Coliva and Palmira’s characterization of the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists as a distinctive kind of conceptual disagreement. Humean skepticism requires evidential justification for all rational beliefs, presenting a narrower conception of rationality. This contrasts with constitutivist hinge epistemology, which posits that our unwarranted hinge propositions — the basic certainties which makes the justifications for ordinary empirical propositions possible — are constitutive of the concept of epistemic rationality, thus they are also rationally accepted by us. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) argue that this divergence reflects a conceptual disagreement over the conception of epistemic rationality, implying a dispute about how the concept of epistemic rationality should be understood. Their strategy is two-fold: they first mentioned Stroud’s (2019) categorization of conceptual disagreement, but contended that the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists represents a novel kind of conceptual disagreement that Stroud’s categorization cannot encompass. They suggest this new framing allows for a rational resolution of the disagreement; second, they argue that the extended conception of rationality is superior because it coherently accounts for the rationality of our epistemic practices. However, I contend that both parts of their two-fold strategy fail. Even if the disagreement is conceptual, it can be understood as a type of disagreement within Stroud’s categorization; therefore, it does not represent a novel type of disagreement. Additionally, I argue that they misinterpret the skeptic’s stance. Skeptics do not assume that our epistemic practices are rational; rather, they doubt the rationality of these practices and the possibility of knowledge. Therefore, for a skeptic, there is no advantage from a conceptual proposal that makes a coherent account of the alleged rationality of our epistemic practices.
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References
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