Wittgenstein è un naturalista?

Abstract

One recurring framework for interpreting the relationship between nature and culture in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is that of so-called “liberal naturalism.” Proponents of this reading point to the naturalistic undertones of several key concepts from his later work – “language game,” “form of life,” “facts of nature,” “natural history,” and so on – arguing that these concepts situate human practice in continuity with our biology, thereby reflecting the deep entanglement of the natural and the symbolic-cultural dimensions that characterizes human life. In this paper, I challenge the legitimacy of this attribution on two grounds. First, I argue that Wittgenstein’s writings do not provide sufficient warrant for labeling his philosophy naturalist – unless “naturalism” is to be understood as an essentially empty category. To make this case, I focus on first-person psychological avowals, which, given their ties to physiological and natural reactions, might seem like the strongest possible evidence for Wittgenstein’s alleged naturalism. I argue that they are not. Second, I contend that reading Wittgenstein’s account of the nature-culture relationship through a naturalist lens is, in any case, ill-advised, as it tends to flatten the complexity of that relationship – ultimately at the expense of the cultural dimension.