Is an Artificial Form of Life Possible?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4396/20260610Parole chiave:
Wittgenstein, form of life, artificial intelligence, rule-following, large language modelsAbstract
This article reassesses the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. It does so by engaging critically with Sebastian Sunday Grève’s Wittgensteinian defense of AI against the biological objection. While largely endorsing Sunday Grève’s conclusion that biological life is not a prerequisite for participation in the human form of life, I argue that his account rests on an insufficiently elaborated understanding of the latter concept. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, the notion of form of life is reinterpreted not as a mere pattern of activity, but as the background of blind, noninterpretative rule-following that makes language-games possible. On this basis, “mindedness” is reframed as an attitude to be acknowledged, rather than a property to be acquired; specifically, as what Wittgenstein calls an “attitude towards a soul”. This framework allows a more nuanced assessment of animals, humanoid robots, and contemporary large language models. I argue that only agents capable of blind rule-following can participate in the human form of life. There is no a priori reason that nonhuman animals or artificial systems must be excluded from this participation. At present, however, there is no evidence that they engage in the human form of life.
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