Kant, l’Io penso e la teoria del riferimento diretto
Abstract
Three key issues emerge from the discussion of I think and transcendental apperception: 1) an epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation I think, 2) a strictly metaphysical problem associated with the features assigned to the thinking subject’s nature, and 3) a semantic problem connected to the type of reference of the representation I. The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of I.
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