Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again
Abstract
Arguably, a theory of assertion should be able to provide (i) a definition of assertion, and (ii) a set of conditions for an assertion to be appropriate. This paper reviews two strands of theories that have attempted to meet this challenge. Commitment-based accounts à la Peirce define assertion in terms of commitment to the truth of the proposition. Restriction-based accounts à la Williamson define assertion in terms of the conditions for its appropriate performance. After assessing the suitability of these projects to meet the desiderata of a theory of assertion, I argue that a speech act theoretic account à la Searle is more suitable for this purpose: it integrates the core intuitions of both restriction-based and commitment-based accounts while avoiding their respective problems, and has the further advantage of determining how assertion fits into a more general theory of illocutionary acts.References
ALSTON, WJ. (2000), Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
BENTON, MA. (2011), «Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion», in Analysis, n. 4, pp. 684–687.
BRANDOM, R. (1983), «Asserting», in Nous, n. 17 (4), pp. 637–650.
BRANDOM, R. (1994), Making it Explicit, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
BACH, K. & HARNISH, R. (1979), Linguistic communication and speech acts. MIT Press, Cambridge.
BROCK, JE. (1981), «Peirce and Searle on assertion», in Proceedings of the CS Peirce Bicentennial Congress, pp. 281-87.
BROCK, JE. (1982), «An introduction to Peirce's theory of speech acts», in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, pp. 319-326.
BROWN, J. (2008), «The Knowledge Norm for Assertion», in Philosophical Issues, n. 18 (1), pp. 89-103.
BROWN J., CAPPELEN H. (eds) (2011) Assertion. New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CAPPELEN, H. (2011), «Against Assertion», in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pp. 21-46.
CARTER, JA. (2014), «Engel on Knowledge and Assertion», in Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, pp. 158–168.
CARTER, JA. & GORDON, EC. (2011), «Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support», in Philosophia, n. 39(4), pp. 615–635.
CHAUVIRÉ, C. (2010), «Indexicalité et assertion chez Peirce», in Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, n. 10 (20-21), pp. 87-101.
DAVIS, W.A. (1999), «Communicating, Telling and Informing», in Philosophical Inquiry, n. 21 (1), pp. 21–43.
DEROSE, K. (2002), «Assertion, Knowledge, and Context», in The Philosophical Review, n. 111 (2), pp. 167-203.
DOUVEN, I (2006) «Assertion, Knowledge, and rational Credibility» in Philosophical Review 115 (4) (October1): 449-485.
DUMMETT, M. (1981), «Assertion», in Frege: Philosophy of language, Duckworth, London, pp. 295-363.
GEACH, P.T. (1965), «Assertion», in Philosophical Review, n. 74 (4), pp. 449-465.
GERKEN, M. (2014), «Same, same but different: the epistemic norms of assertion, action and practical reasoning», in Philosophical Studies, n. 168 (3), pp. 725-744.
GREEN, MS. (2000), «Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content», in Linguistics and Philosophy, n. (23), pp. 435-473.
GREEN, MS. (2007), Self-Expression, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
GRICE, HP. (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
HINDRIKS, F. (2007), «The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion», in Linguistics and Philosophy, n. 30 (3), pp. 393-406.
HOOKWAY, C. (2000), Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes From Peirce. Oxford University Press.
HOOKWAY, C. (1985), Peirce, Routledge, London.
KVANVIG, J. (2009), «Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries», in Greenough, P. & Pritchard, D. (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
KVANVIG, J. (2011), «Norms of Assertion», in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pp. 233-250.
LABINAZ, P., & SBISÀ, M. (2014), «Certainty and Uncertainty in Assertive Speech Acts», in Communicating Certainty and Uncertainty in Medical, Supportive and Scientific Contexts, Riccioni, I., Canestrari, C., Zuczkowski, A., Bongelli, R. (eds.), John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam. LACKEY, J. (2007), «Norms of Assertion», in Nous, n. 41 (4), pp. 594–626.
LEVIN, J. (2008), «Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge», in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n. 76 (2), pp. 359-384.
LEWIS, D. (1975), «“Languages and language», in Gunderson, K. (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, pp.3-35.
MACFARLANE, J. (2003a), «Future Contingents and Relative Truth», in The Philosophical Quarterly, n. 53 (212), pp. 321-336.
MACFARLANE, J. (2003b), «Epistemic modalities and relative truth», Unpublished draft, url=http://johnmacfarlane.net/epistmod-2003.pdf
MACFARLANE, J. (2005), «Making Sense of Relative Truth», in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n. 105 (1), pp. 321-339.
MACFARLANE, J. (2011), «What Is Assertion?», in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pp. 79-96.
MAITRA, I. (2011), «Assertion, Norms, and Games», in Brown, J. & Cappelen, H.(eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pp. 277-296.
MARSILI, N. manuscript. «The norm of assertion: a constitutive norm?».
MCCAMMON, C. (2014), «Representing Yourself as Knowing», in American Philosophical Quarterly, n. 51 (2), pp. 1–14.
PAGIN, P. (2015), «Problems with Norms of Assertion», in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12209
PELLING, C. (2011), «A Self-Referential Paradox for the Truth Account of Assertion», in Analysis, n. 71 (4), pp. 688-688.
PELLING, C. (2012), «Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion», in Erkenntnis, n. 78 (5), pp. 977-978.
POLLOCK, J. L. (1982) Language and Thought, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
RAWLS, J. (1955), «Two Concepts of Rules», in The Philosophical Review, n. 64 (1), pp. 3-32.
REINACH. A. (1913), «The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law», in Aletheia, n. 3 (1983), pp. 1-142.
RESCORLA, M. (2009), «Assertion and its constitutive norms», in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n. 79 (1), pp. 98-130.
RUSSELL, B. (1905), «On denoting», in Mind, n. 14 (56), pp. 479-493.
SEARLE, JR. (1969), Speech Acts: A Theory in the Philosophy of Language, CUP, Cambridge.
SEARLE, JR. (1975), «The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse», in New Literary History, n. 6 (2), pp. 319-332.
SEARLE, JR. & VANDERVEKEN, D. (1985), Foundations of illocutionary logic, CUP, Cambridge.
TURRI, J. (2013), «Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion», in Philosophical Studies, n. 167 (3), pp. 557-567.
TURRI, J. (2014), «You Gotta Believe!», in Epistemic Norms, n. 32, pp. 646-647.
TUZET, G. (2006), «Responsible for Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion», in Cognitio, n. 7, pp. 317-336.
VLACH, F. (1981), «Speaker's meaning», in Linguistics and Philosophy, n. 4 (3), pp.359-391.
WATSON, G. (2003), «Asserting and Promising», in Philosophical Studies, n. 117 (1), pp. 57-77.
WEINER, M. (2005), «Must We Know What We Say?», in Philosophical Review, n.114 (2), pp. 227–251.
WHITING, D. (2012), «Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion», in Erkenntnis, n. 78 (4), pp. 847–867.
WILLIAMS, BAO. (2002), Truth & truthfulness: An essay in genealogy, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
WILLIAMSON, T. (1996), «Knowing and Asserting», in The Philosophical Review, n. 105 (4), pp. 489-523.
WILLIAMSON, T. (2000), «Assertion», in Knowledge and Its Limits, pp. 238-270.
WRIGHT, C. (1992), Truth and Objectivity, HUP, Cambridge, Mass. Peirce's Writings [CP] Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., Burks, A.W. (eds.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931-1958.
[NEM] The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, C. Eisele (ed.), Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1976.
[MS] The Charles S. Peirce Papers, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, 1966, microfilm, 33 reels including supplement.
Works published in RIFL are released under Creative Commons Licence:Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
