Meaning as use and the philosophy of language. A guided tour of problems and responses
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4396/20260606Keywords:
linguistic sign, meaning, reference, name, useAbstract
In this article I discuss Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as use and the associated notion of explanation of meaning in relation certain assumptions, problems, and positions in the philosophy of language. The issues addressed include the notion of linguistic sign and language learning, syntax, truth-conditions and verification, and the possibility of truth-conditional semantics. I also discuss the nature of names, the relationship between meaning and reference, and Kripke’s distinction between determining meaning and fixing reference. I conclude my discussion by addressing the question, whether philosophy of language can be used to establish a basis for metaphysics, as Kripke has aspired to do. The unifying theme in my tour of this wide-ranging set of issues is how Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning as use can help to address problems in the philosophy of language, and what a Wittgensteinian philosophy of language might consequently look like.
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Works published in RIFL are released under Creative Commons Licence:Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
