What is the locus of abilities?
Abstract
Loughlin’s (2018) uses Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philsophical Investigations to motivate his ‘wide’ view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of ability, the support for the wide view is not as straightforward. The criteria for using the concept of ability are highly context-dependent, and there is not a single account for them. This shows that at best, a moderate form of anti-individualism for cognitive capacities can be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds. Furthermore, the suggestion that ontological questions can be bypassed is questioned.Riferimenti bibliografici
Baker, Gordon P. (2004), Wittgenstein’s Method and the Private Language Argument, in Baker, Gordon P., Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 119-29.
Baker, G. P., Hacker P. M. S. (1990), «Malcolm on Language and Rules», in Philosophy, vol. 65, n. 252, pp. 167-179.
Bernecker, Sven (2014), «How to Understand the Extended Mind», in Philosophical Issues, n. 24, pp. 1-23.
Carter, J. A., Czarnecki, B. (2016), «Extended Knowledge-How», in Erkentniss, n. 81, pp. 259-273.
Clark, A., Chalmers, D. (1998), «The Extended Mind», in Analysis, n. 58, pp. 10-23.
Hacker, Peter M.S. (1990), Wittgenstein, Meaning and Mind, Blackwell, Oxford.
Hacker, Peter M. S. (2010), Robinson Crusoe Sails Again: The Interpretative Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, in Venturinha Nuno, ed., Wittgenstein After His Nachlass, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 91-109.
Loughlin, Victor (2018), «Going Wide: Extended Mind and Wittgenstein», in Adaptive Behaviour, vol. 26, n. 6, pp. 276-283.
Loughlin, V., Zahidi K. (2017), «What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?», in European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 25, n. 4, pp. 1614-39.
Malcolm, Norman (1989), «Wittgenstein on Language and Rules», in Philosophy, n. 64, pp. 5-28.
McClamrock, Ron (1995), Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Palermos, S. Orestis (2014), «Loops, Constitution and Cognitive Extension», in Cognitive Systems Research, n. 27, pp. 25-41.
Pöyhönen, Samuli (2014), «Explanatory Power and Extended Cognition», in Philosophical Psychology, vol. 27, n. 5, pp. 735-759.
Rupert, Robert (2004), «Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition», in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 101, n. 8, pp. 389-428.
Sprevak, Mark (2010), «Inference to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition», in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, n. 41, pp. 353-362.
Strawson, Peter F. (1959), Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Routledge, London-New York.
Witherspoon, Edward (2011), Wittgenstein on Criteria and the Problem of Other Minds, in Kuusela O., McGinn M., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press, New York, from .
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953), Philosophical Investigations, ed. by P. M. S. Hacker., J. Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken 2009).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958), The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ’Philosophical Investigations’, ed. by R. Rhee, Harper, New York.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1977), Bemerkungen über die Farben/Remarks on Colour, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2005), The Big Typescript: TS 213 German English Scholars’ Edition, ed. by C. Grant Luckhardt e Maximilian E. Aue, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.