On the explanatory value of the concept-conception distinction
Abstract
The distinction between concept and conception has been widely debated in political philosophy, whereas in the philosophy of psychology is frequently used, but rarely focused on. This paper aims at filling in this lacuna. I claim that far from being explanatorily idle, the distinction makes it possible to provide an adequate description of phenomena such as genuine disagreement, and concept contestation, which would otherwise remain implausibly puzzling. I illustrate and assess three accounts of the concept-conception distinction. Finally I propose a social externalist account, which relies on deference to experts, and builds on Tyler Burge’s ideas of many decades ago. The debate on concepts and conceptions thus shows a connection with the increasing research work on experts and expertise in psychology and social epistemology.Riferimenti bibliografici
BURGE, Tyler (2009), «Intellectual norms and the foundations of mind», in The Journal of Philosophy, 1986, 697-720, reprinted in Foundations of Mind, Oxford, OUP.
CAREY, Susan (2009), The origins of concepts, OUP, Oxford.
CRILEY, Mark (2007), Contested concepts and competing conceptions, ProQuest.
DWORKIN, Ronald (1988), Law's Empire, Harvard University Press, Harvard, Mass.
ERICSSON, K. Anders, CHARNESS, P., FELTOVICH, J., HOFFMAN, R. [a cura di] (2006), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York.
GALLIE, W.B. (1956), «Essentially Contested Concepts», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.56, pp. 167-98.
GELMAN, Susan (2005), Psychological Science Agenda: May 2005. Psychological Science.
GOLDMAN, Alvin (2001), «Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?» in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , n. 63, pp. 85-110.
HAMPTON, James (2010), «Concept talk cannot be avoided», in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, n. 33(2-3), pp. 212-213.
LAKOFF, George (2006), Thinking points: Communicating our American values and vision: a progressive’s handbook, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.
LALUMERA, Elisabetta (2010), «Concepts are a functional kind», in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, n. 33(2-3), pp. 217-218.
MACHERY, Edouard (2009), Doing without concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
MARGOLIS, Eric, & LAURENCE, Stephen (2007), «The Ontology of Concepts —Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?», in Noûs, n. 41(4), pp. 561-593.
MEDIN, Daniel, & ORTONY, Andrew (1989), «Psychological essentialism», in S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony [a cura di], Similarity and analogical reasoning, pp. 179-195, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
MILLIKAN, Ruth (2005), Language: a Biological Model, OUP, Oxford.
PEACOCKE, Christopher (1992), A study of concepts, The MIT Press, New York.
PEACOCKE, Christopher (1998), «Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality», in Philosophical issues, pp. 43-88.
RAWLS, John (1999), A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
REY, Georges (1985), «Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips», in Cognition n. 19, pp. 297-303.
REY, Georges (2010), «Concepts versus conceptions (again) », in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, n. 33 (2-3), pp. 221-222.
SELINGER, Evan, & CREASE, Robert. (eds.) (2006), The Philosophy of Expertise, Columbia University Press, New York.
WILLIAMSON, Timothy (2007), The philosophy of Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford.
Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
