Synesthesia as a corporeal praxis of meaning: between Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein

Abstract

The contribution aims to formulate a description of phenomenal sense as a dynamic result of the encounter of a phenomenon with the synesthetic perceptual praxis. To do this, we will preliminarily propose a description of perception in synesthetic terms, starting with the peculiar Heller-Roazen's reading of the term synaisthesis from Aristotle onwards. Through this passage it will be exposed an ancient conception of the intersection of sensory fields, as well as the pre-reflective nature of the sense of the phenomenon. What we are going to show is the preliminary direct relation that the phenomenal sense engages with the synesthetic structure of corporeality rather than belonging to the field of consciousness. We will then consider developments from Schilder's neuropsychiatry and Cytowic's neurology to shed light on the normal character of synesthetic perception not only at the level of the body schema but also at the level of cross talk brain functioning. From here we will move on, with Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, to analyse the regular character of the synesthetic experience, highlighting the importance of a bodily praxis of meaning that emphasizes the primacy of the non-thematic moment of knowledge of the phenomenal. We will articulate this passage with a reading aimed to hold together the phenomenological theory of the Abschattungen, and the constitutive indeterminacy of phenomenal meaning by Merleau-Ponty, with the Wittgensteinian theme of the pluristability and immediacy of perceptual experience.