From tools to social agents

  • Anna Strasser
Keywords: artificial systems, social interaction, joint actions, minimal approach, social cognition


Up to now, our understanding of sociality is neatly tied to living beings. However, recent developments in Artificial Intelligence make it conceivable that we may entertain social interactions with artificial systems in the near future. With reference to minimal approaches describing socio-cognitive abilities, this paper presents a strategy of how social interactions between humans and artificial agents can be captured. Taking joint actions as a paradigmatic example, minimal necessary conditions for artificial agents are elaborated. To this end, it is first argued that multiple realizations of socio-cognitive abilities can lead to asymmetric cases of joint actions. In a second step, minimal conditions of agency and coordination in order to qualify as social agents in joint actions are discussed.


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How to Cite
Strasser, A. (2020) “From tools to social agents ”, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 14(2). doi: 10.4396/AISB201907.