Art, knowledge and induction
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to try to show some connections between Goodman’s paradox of induction and Goodman’s theory on aesthetics. This will be attempted also by means of the reference to Hempel’s paradox. Goodman’s point of view on induction takes as very relevant the notion of “entrenchment” while his conception of art gives a parallel importance to the whole context where we are required to express our evaluation of the meaning of the work of art, where the notion of “habits” seems to be involved in a very relevant manner. In both the cases, Goodman’s reflexion is related to his nominalism, but his strategy in the analysis of induction seems exposed to some objections, that we try to examine by relying on the notion of nonmonotonic reasoning, that we use also in the inquire about Hempel’s paradox. On this ground, we present some remarks on some of the main points of Goodman’s aesthetics.References
ABRUSCI, Michele (1997), «Logica Lineare e Filosofia della Scienza», in Paradigmi, 44, pp. 265-283.
ADLER, Jonathan (1980), Criteria for a Good Inductive Logic, in COHEN, Jonathan, HESSE, Mary, eds., Applications of Inductive Logic, Clarendon, Oxford, pp. 379-405.
BENNETT, John (1974), «Depiction and convention», in The Monist, 58(2), pp. 255-268.
BROWN, Harold (1977), Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
BOEDDU, Ilaria (2007), «Arte e scienza: quale relazione? Alcune riflessioni sulla filosofia di Nelson Goodman», in Epistemologia, 30(1), pp. 101-121.
CARNAP, Rudolf (1947), «On the Application of Inductive Logic», in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, pp. 133-48.
CELLUCCI, Carlo (1998), Le ragioni della logica, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
CHIODO, Simona (2006), Visione o costruzione: Nelson Goodman e la filosofia analitica contemporanea, LED, Milano.
COHNITZ, Daniel, ROSSBERG, Marcus (2014), Nelson Goodman, Routledge London, New York.
DE CARVALHO, Eros (2013), «Goodman e o equilìbrio reflexivo», in Veritas, 58(3), pp. 467-481.
DE DONATO-RODRÌGUEZ, Xavier (2009), «Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism», in Teoria, 24(65), pp. 213-225.
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2003), «Un’analisi dei paradossi della conferma proposti da Carl Gustav Hempel», in Itinerari, 3, pp. 121-134 (in the text, my translation from italian).
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2009), «Some Remarks about Relativism and Induction», in Ratio Sociologica, 2, pp. 23-42.
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2012a), «Communication, Action and Inductive Practice. The Practical Effects of Inductive Reasoning on the Patterns of Human Relation», in Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 5, pp. 38-53.
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2012b), Teoria della razionalità, pluralismo democratico e ruolo degli intellettuali, in PIRNI, Alberto, ed., Verità del potere, potere della verità, ETS, Pisa.
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2017a), Relatività del sapere ed epistemologia del pluralismo, in SCIACCA, Fabrizio, ed., Domande e metodi, Bonanno, Acireale-Roma, pp. 55-74.
DI PROSPERO, Alfonso (2017b), «Conoscenza, emozioni e struttura dell’intersoggettività: riflessioni sulla figura del servo e del signore in Hegel», in Studi di estetica, 14, pp. 151-176.
ELGIN, Catherine (2000), «Reorienting Aesthetics, Reconceiving Cognition», in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58(3), pp. 219-225.
ELGIN, Catherine (2001), «The Legacy of Nelson Goodman», in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3), pp. 679-690.
FEYERABEND, Paul (1968), «A Note on Two ‘Problems’ of Induction», in The British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 19(3), pp. 251-253.
FITELSON, Branden (2005), Inductive logic, in SARKAR, Sahotra, PFEIFER, Jessica, eds., The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge, New York, pp. 384-393.
FITELSON, Branden (2006), «The Paradox of Confirmation», in Philosophy Compass, 1(1), pp. 95-113.
FITELSON, Branden (2008), «Goodman’s “New Riddle”», in Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37(6), pp. 613-643.
FITELSON, Branden, HAWTHORNE, James (2010), «The Wason Task(s) and the Raven Paradox», in Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), pp. 207-241.
FITELSON, Branden, HAWTHORNE, James (2011), How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens, in EELLS, Ellery, FETZER, James, eds., The Place of Probability in Science, Springer, New York, pp. 247-275.
GKOGKAS, Nikolaos (2008), Nelson Goodman and the Case for a Kalological Aesthetics, Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke.
GOODMAN, Nelson, LEONARD, Henry (1940), «The Calculus of Individuals and its Uses», in Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5, pp. 45-55.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1951), The Structure of Appearance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1969), Languages of Art, Oxford University Press, London.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1972), Problems and Projects, Bobbs-Merrill, New York.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1978a), Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, Indianapolis.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1978b), «In Defense of Irrealism, Letter to the Editor», in The New York Review of Books, 25(20), p. 58.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1979), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
GOODMAN, Nelson (1984), Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
GOODMAN, Nelson, ELGIN, Catherine (1988), Reconceptions in Philosophy, Routledge, London.
HANDJARAS, Luciano (1983), Linguaggio, esperienza e convenzione, Alfani, Firenze.
HANDJARAS, Luciano (1991), Problemi e progetti del costruzionismo, Angeli, Milano (in the text, my translation from italian).
HANDJARAS, Luciano (2001), Immaginare un linguaggio. Ricostruzioni in filosofia analitica, Angeli, Milano.
HANDJARAS, Luciano (2005), L’arte nel pensiero analitico, Clinamen, Firenze.
HEMPEL, Carl Gustav (1943), «A purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation», in The Journal of Symbolic logic, 8(4), pp. 122-143.
HEMPEL, Carl Gustav (1945), «Studies in the Logic of Confirmation», in Mind, 54 (213-214), pp. 91-26, 97-121.
HEMPEL, Carl Gustav (1966) Recent Problems on Induction, in COLODNY, Robert, ed., Mind and Cosmos, Pittsburg U.P., Kansas, pp. 112-134.
MARCHETTI, Luca (2006), Arte ed estetica in Nelson Goodman, Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, Palermo.
MUSGRAVE, A. (2011), Popper and hypothetico-deductivism, in GABBAY, Dov, WOODS, John, eds., Inductive Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 205-234.
POPPER, Karl Raimund (1969), Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
QUINE, Willard V.O. (1978), «Otherworldly», in The New York Review of Books, 25(18), p. 25.
ROMANOS, George (1977), «On the “Immediacy” of Art», in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 36(1) pp. 73-80.
SALMON, Wesley (1969), Partial Entailment as a Basis for Inductive Logic, in RESCHER, Nicholas, ed., Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Synthese Library, Springer, Dordrecht, vol. 24, pp. 47-82.
SCHURZ, Gerhard (2014), Philosophy of Science: a Unified Approach, Routledge, New York.
SEIDE, Ansgar (2009), Contextualist References in Nelson Goodman’s Solution to the “New Riddle of Induction”, in ERNST Gerhard, STEINBRENNER, Jacob, SCHOLZ, Oliver, eds., From Logic to Art. Themes from Nelson Goodman, Ontos-Verlag, Frankfurt, pp. 121-136.
SHOTTENKIRK, Dena (2009), Nominalism and Its Aftermath, Springer, London.
STALKER, Douglas, (1994), ed., Grue! The New Riddle of Induction, Open Court, La Salle.
STEINBRENNER, Jacob (2009), Art-Samples. On the Connection between Art and Science, in ERNST, Gerhard, STEINBRENNER, Jacob, SCHOLZ, Oliver, eds., From Logic to Art. Themes from Nelson Goodman, Ontos-Verlag, Frankfurt, pp. 251-268.
VARZI, Achille, «Mondo-versioni e versioni del mondo», preface to GOODMAN, Nelson (2008), Vedere e costruire il mondo, trnsl. by C. Marletti, 2nd ed., Laterza, Roma-Bari, pp.vii-xxiv (in the text, my translation from italian).
Works published in RIFL are released under Creative Commons Licence:Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
