The pain of the others. Wittgenstein and the philosophical zombies

Abstract

The problem of the third (or second) person perspective, i.e., the problem of other minds, can be rephrased as follows: how can I be sure of the existence of other minds, i.e., that other people suffer, rejoice and have all the mental states that I have as well? If I have no direct access to other people’s minds, and can only infer other people’s mental states through external criteria, can I not imagine that people are actually androids, perfectly identical to humans, designed to behave like them, but without any mental experience? In fact, philosophical reflection on the asymmetry between the first and third person has generated a special kind of monster: philosophical zombies (Chalmers 1999), that is, creatures identical to us, who behave like us, seem to feel emotions like us, but actually feel nothing, because they have no mental life. Not surprisingly, Wittgenstein, recognizing this asymmetry, also acknowledged the conceivability of zombies (see, e.g., Wittgenstein 1967, §§ 528-9; 1953, § 420). In this contribution, I will show the way in which Wittgenstein approaches the problem of other minds, analyzing the specificity of first-person ascription, but without denying the reality of other minds, and thereby rejecting the solipsism we often arrive at when reflecting on the peculiarities of the first person. In this analysis, a central role is again given to the misunderstandings generated by the misuse of language, and the tendency in philosophy to be misled by misleading analogies (Wittgenstein 1953, 1958). Reflection on the reality of others’ minds is once again an opportunity for Wittgenstein to warn us against the destructive power of philosophy, which transforms the possibility of doubting others’ emotions and feelings into a general uncertainty, a constant doubt about the sincerity of others.